vided twenty-six weeks of paid sick leave.1 Administration of the act wasmembers as of 1912), only increased that number to 1.48 million by 1938 (down to 8.1 percent of the total and a third of union membership overall). Much of the decline in lodge and union membership was picked up by centralized friendly societies, which provided mutual sickness insurance to their members but came with few of the rituals or mechanisms of self-government that had long embodied working-class voluntarism. These societies, along with the insurance companies, were especially effective at attracting women into their ranks. Of the 6.1 million women covered by the NIA in 1938, 3.35 million belonged to approved societies run by companies and an additional 1.64 million joined centralized friendly societies. The "threatened doom of gradual extinction," which an editorial suggested in 1912 might be the friendly societies' fate under the NIA, was starting to set in within a generation of its enactment. 17 
THE NIA AND THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WELFARE STATE
Most historians of the NIA have looked back on it from one of two vantage points: its damning evaluation in 1942 by William Beveridge (who criticized its failure to perpetuate the ideals of voluntarism), or its eventual replacement by the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948 (which implemented Beveridge's nationalization scheme but did not, as he had hoped it would, preserve room in that scheme for friendly societies). In different ways, each of these perspectives has obscured the contest between community and consumerism that was waged under the act. Those who look back from Beveridge sharply distinguish friendly societies from insurance companies in order to recapture Beveridge's effort to retain a place for voluntarism in a reconstructed welfare state. These historians identify the similarly bureaucratic structures of insurance companies and government departments and pair these two institutions as natural allies in the trampling of community. In doing so, they demonize the companies to the point of ignoring the many revealing continuities they shared with voluntary societies. Those who look back from the NHS, in contrast, present both the clubs and the companies as belonging to a temporary and not very interesting episode, since neither survived the transition to a fully funded state-administered health service. The only important contest, for them, was between "the state" and an undifferentiated "society," and in that narrow sense the NIA marked a partial advance by the state in what would become a complete victory thirty-six years later.
The view from the Beveridge Report, usually found in more detailed studies of the NIA's origins, is suspicious about the act's rightful place in a social-democratic trajectory. Its starting point is Beveridge's announcement that "the approved society system in its present form has served its purpose and had its day," paired with his assertion that "voluntary insurance against sickness is covered adequately and on right principles by the Friendly Societies, with their long traditions of disinterested service and brotherly co-operation." Beveridge hoped to switch from contributory insurance to a system that was fully funded by the state (hence securing a "national minimum" for all citizens) without wholly abandoning the administration of national insurance by voluntary societies. Such societies, he claimed, should be admitted into partnership with the state only if they had no ties to for-profit insurance, were "effectively selfgoverning," and were willing to provide bonus coverage to state-insured members out of their voluntary subscriptions. This arrangement would, by definition, exclude insurance companies from the field, while giving friendly societies a boost by handing over to them a captive membership. At the same time, he hoped, it would keep voluntarism alive by giving citizens a first-hand view of its merits. 18 The perspective of Beveridge's influential report (which was not, however, influential enough to save the friendly societies) has been revisited by successive historians, each of whom has modulated his tone to suit the political tenor of the time. The first historian of interwar welfare policy to consider his perspective seriously was Bentley Gilbert, whose exploration of "the evolution of national insurance" has been the standard reference on the topic since its publication in 1966. Like Beveridge, but with less hope for reversing the trend, Gilbert lamented the NIA's role in endangering "the democratically run and altogether admirable friendly societies," which, owing to competition with insurance companies, "began to lose their old fraternal character" after 1911. A generation later, Stephen Yeo relocated Gilbert's account of the NIA in an even more pessimistic narrative in which "the creative, public, associational voluntary life of so many English working people ... has been subordinated, rendered less ambitious, or assimilated to rational capitalist or bureaucratic models." Like Gilbert, Yeo saw the insurance companies as an alienating force that led citizens into "a refusal to be attached in any deeply-felt way to 'the state' or to most other benevolent-seeming associations."19 Finally, a post-Thatcherite twist on the Beveridge view informs David Green's discussion of the NIA, which recounted how the "incomplete evolution" of voluntarism "was prematurely halted by the march of socialism." With more hope than either Gilbert or Yeo, Green proposed that friendly societies, with their traditions of "natural justice" and "shared personal responsibility," could once again act as a viable model for social reform once Margaret Thatcher had discredited the welfare state. 20 The view from the Beveridge Report rests on a thorough opposition between community and consumerism. Gilbert displayed a condescending impatience with "the lack of economic self-discipline among the lower levels of the English working class," whose failure to join friendly societies opened the door for the insurance companies' invitation to participate in the NIA. Yeo more forgivingly attributed voluntarism's decline to "the absolute deprivation of spare time, money and cultural resources for all but a minority stratum of workers"; but his clear preference for the extinguished creativity of the few over the "crabbed, deformed autonomy" of the many cut short any attempt to inquire more deeply into the consumerist workings of welfare.21 Notwithstanding their different political perspectives, these accounts all express nostalgia for "an age of individual responsibility," which diverts blame for the failure of voluntarism onto working-class consumption patterns or plutocratic meddling.22 Lamenting voluntarism's "incomplete evolution" as a basis for British state formation also forestalls a more detailed analysis of the sources and implications of the insurance companies' success in this regard. Without such an analysis, important distinctions between state-administered and companyadministered social policy are blurred. "The gigantic industrial insurance industry" becomes a brush for tarring "bloated states masquerading as socialisms"-or vice versa, depending on one's point of view. 23 Such concerns are absent in a second variety of historical writing on British welfare policy, which sees all approved societies-friendly societies, trade 20 unions, and insurance companies-as transitional institutions between "civil society" and "the state." Instead of blurring the distinction between central government and large corporations, this approach obscures the conflicting claims of community and consumerism. Community, as a possible perspective from which to criticize the welfare state, drops out of this story by being identified with the end process of state formation-as in T. H. Marshall's claim that the NHS and related laws molded a new form of citizenship, defined as "full membership of a community."24 Consumerism, at least in the limited sense of private purchase of insurance services, drops out owing to the hindsight that the companies' participation in social insurance was destined to be a temporary expedient. This dichotomy between "state" and "society" appeared in a typical form in Geoffrey Finlayson's survey of British social welfare, which viewed the state as gradually taking on functions that the "informal sector" eventually lost the capacity to perform. Finlayson included friendly societies, insurance companies, and charities as part of this sector, which he then contrasted with "the state ... with its attributes of centralization and uniformity, professionalism and expertise, resources and capacity." He recognized the potential for conflict between commercial insurance and voluntarism; but, by describing this as an "independent, localized, and competitive effort," he missed the organizational chasm separating the companies from the friendly societies-although the former, for instance, were anything but local.25 Most recent historians of the welfare state have been conscious of what Peter Baldwin calls "welfare whiggery": the tendency to read post-1945 innovations back into an earlier age. But instead of combating those dangers by delving into the actual workings of social insurance prior to 1948, many have done so by identifying backward-looking motives among the pioneers of welfare policy. Hence Finlayson pointed to "moralistic ideas ... among those who helped to lay the foundation of the challenge to older policies and practices"; and E. P. Hennock discovered a blend of sincere commitment to voluntarism (by Braithwaite) with a willingness (by Lloyd George) to settle for a specious "voluntary" model mainly in order to distinguish British social insurance from the existing variety on offer in Germany.26 In her study of the NIA during the interwar years, Noelle Whiteside countered welfare whiggery in a different way, by stressing the constraining force of fiscal conservatism. Prying away the New Liberals' public face to reveal the "internal machinations within central government," she showed how political pressures to balance the budget led civil servants to restrict the approved societies' ability to do the public's business.27 This focus on "internal machinations" is valuable for identifying how politicians impeded the survival of voluntarism, just as a focus on motivation suggests the reverse for Braithwaite and Lloyd George. By continuing to view the NIA as essentially the product of central government, though, neither style of revisionism identifies the important differences that made the insurance companies so much more appealing than friendly societies among those who had been uninsured prior to 1911. To do so, as I suggest below, it is necessary to view such people as consumers as well as citizens, and to view "community" in terms that extend beyond Marshall's statist ideal.
Historians of medicine who have traced the ancestry of the NHS do focus on approved society members as consumers, but only in the limited sense of the doctor-patient relationship. Jane Lewis, for instance, has identified "the three major groups of protagonists" in the provision of British health care during the twentieth century as "the medical profession, 'consumers' and the state"-a view that leads her to discuss the interwar era strictly in terms of debates between the Ministry of Health and various doctors' groups.28 This approach has valuably revealed how the NIA produced new trends in workingclass consumption of medical services, and it has provided even more detail on the changing income levels and professional duties of the new "panel doc as a chapter in the history of medicine inherently shifts the focus away from approved societies, since the local insurance committees established under the act impeded direct contact between insurance providers and doctors. As a result, doctor-focused histories are apt to view the NIA mainly in terms of the hospitals, insurance committees, and other local authorities that framed the medical practitioner's daily routine.30 Such histories have revealed much about what happened when a worker fell sick in interwar Britain, but very little about the considerations that led healthy workers to decide which approved society to join.
JOINING AND CONSUMING, 1880-1910
Forty years ago the political scientist Harry Eckstein condemned the NIA as "one of the more absurd chapters in the history of public administration." Its absurdity stemmed from the fact that none of the three main providers that were called in to administer the act-friendly societies, commercial insurance companies, and trade unions-were primarily interested in providing national health insurance. Instead, each was interested in using their right to pay sickness claims to the British worker as a means to attain ulterior ends: to make new converts, respectively, to the principles of fraternal self-help, mass marketing, or organized labor. Judged by its intended consequence of severing the connection between sickness and poverty, the result was needlessly inefficient and socially divisive.31 Judged, however, by its unintended consequences, the NIA stands as a wholly unique moment in British social policy: a great government-sponsored contest that pitted against each other three radically different visions of social organization. Using sickness claims as counters, each of the participants in this contest tried to reshape British society in its own image.
The contest that the NIA politicized and nationalized had been brewing for three decades prior to 1911, during which time friendly societies and insurance companies were only the two most prominent institutions to compete for the right to define the meaning of mutual thrift. These institutions took center stage, as they would under the act, because "thrift"-defined as pooling funds for a member's sick leave, for example, or a child's wake-was their primary 30 For a brief account of the occasions when doctors and approved societies did interact, see Honigsbaum, pp. 16-21. David Green sees the relative lack of direct contact between insurers and doctors as the primary cause of the loss in "consumer control" over medical practice after 1911, and as one of the medical profession's primary objects in its negotiations with the state leading up to the act: see Green, Rein- Although lodge members took pride in defying the "impersonal" tenets of the market, friendly societies paradoxically owed their high levels of membership to successful marketing techniques. This tension appeared in the most basic (and apparently least "consumerist") motive for joining friendly societies, namely, the desire to belong to a group of comparably "respectable" working men. As in any other club, membership in a friendly society offered a young man friendship insurance, which included among its benefits a familiar face at the pub or a good turnout at a member's funeral.34 Even benefits as intangible as these, however, had their material side, in the form of the robes, sashes, and songbooks that distinguished members of different lodges from each other and from nonclub men. Historians of American friendly societies have argued that purchasing and wearing all this regalia in public constituted an important opportunity for members to display "their consumer prowess," linking "the public display of consumption with class and gender pride."35 Men who purchased club regalia spent their discretionary income (the portion that did not directly proceed to the household budget) on a "respectable" alternative to gambling or heavy drinking. This material investment in community was an important source of motivation for the long hours they spent on rule making, bookkeeping, and sick visitation.36
These relatively subtle tensions between an anticonsumerist ethos and the practice of consumption came closer to the surface in the friendly societies' other primary function, insurance against lost wages due to sickness. Unlike out-of-pocket expenditure on regalia, subscription to a club's sick fund came from the member's household budget, which was more often than not "managed" by his wife. The result, as Mary Ann Clawson has observed, was a conflict between the club's proclamation of "the emotional self-sufficiency of men" and the domestic virtue of "sexual complementarity."37 Club dues were a regular fixture in working families' weekly budgets, and wives tenaciously made sure their husbands kept up payments and followed the club's rules governing behavior. In some cases the active intervention of wives in their capacity as household managers sufficiently disrupted the friendly societies' "fraternal" self-image to call for a response, as when a Preston lodge voted to forbid "members sending their money ... by women and children." Wives' efforts to define friendly society membership as the consumption of insurance (and thereby as provision for the entire family) received assistance from the clubs' middle-class leaders, as well as from the government and the law courts, which encouraged administrative changes that improved the affiliated orders' financial security. What has typically been seen as a "class" tension between friendly societies' leaders and their rank and file was hence replayed as part of the constant negotiation between husbands and wives regarding control over the "family wage."38
Whether exercised in fraternal display or the purchase of insurance, consumption was crucial to the very existence of friendly societies. In the affiliated orders' mid-Victorian heyday, these two forms of consumption stood in rough equipoise. By the turn of the century, owing to the more rigorous 1875 Friendly Societies Act and the spread of middle-class domestic values to more working families, that balance had started to tilt irrevocably toward insurance as the prevailing object of lodge members' consumption. Once this happened, a similar imbalance began to appear between the two types of community that formed around the friendly societies' consumption patterns. The ascendant "insurance" form created what Francois Ewald has called "abstract mutualities," which allowed members "to enjoy the advantages of association while still leaving them free to exist as individuals." The waning "fraternal" form created "qualitative mutualities," which required individuals to submit aspects of their personality to a single creed.39 Both as an object of consumption and as a form of "mutuality," the transition from fraternity to insurance led to an organizational bind that was unique to friendly societies. They could not allow members to "exist as individuals" without devaluing the fraternal symbols that motivated brothers to perform the lodge's necessary work. This made it difficult for friendly societies to adapt to new male consumption patterns that were less focused on fraternity, and it also limited their ability to develop fully the actuarial reasoning that underlay their newfound existence as "abstract mutualities." By 1900, male consumption patterns had moved away from mutual proclamations of "emotional self-sufficiency" toward membership in larger and more diffuse groups, which pledged muted allegiance to a brand name or to While these new forms of mass consumption were threatening friendly societies from one direction, the societies also suffered from their tortured efforts to square their new standards of actuarial soundness with their older commitment to frateralism. Members in reformed societies faced new requirements for belonging that valued regular payment over "qualitative" factors like respectability or good fellowship-which led to a rising proportion of lapses, since the clubs' prior definitions of mutuality had provided a safety net for members who were temporarily out of pocket. Unlike insurance companies, which tried to keep lapses at a minimum in order to prevent customer dissatisfaction, friendly societies were much slower to see the negative consequences of letting members lapse. Instead, they moralized their lapses away, arguing that a member proved by lapsing that he had never been sufficiently prudent to begin with. The result was a decline in mutuality, whether defined in the "abstract" or the "qualitative" sense-what Dot Jones has called "a converse Robin Hood effect" in which the poorest members of society sustained the financial security of the rest. Finally, the friendly societies' hesitance to depart from fraternalism made it hard for them to cater to the millions of women who entered the workforce after 1880. One possible solution, the founding of women-only clubs, went nowhere: fewer than 20,000 women belonged to such Commercial insurance companies directly benefited from, and helped instigate, many of the changes in consumer taste that worked against the affiliated orders. Until 1911, direct competition between the affiliated orders and the insurance companies was almost nonexistent, since the latter stayed out of health insurance and specialized instead in securing against the contingency of working-class burials-something the orders never extensively provided. At a more abstract level, however, the sources of conflict between these two institutions stretched back into the nineteenth century. Just as friendly societies practiced consumption even as they preached community, industrial insurance companies preached the virtues of working-class community as a means of selling their policies to millions of low-income households. The companies discovered that it paid to find out what forms of community inspired allegiance in their employees and customers, then alter their managerial and marketing strategies accordingly. As employers of working-class salesmen, they took advantage of the existing emotional appeal of fraternalism by restaging fraternal rituals in their regular sales meetings. And as sellers to the working poor, they severed "thrift" from its middle-class focus on social mobility so as to attach it more firmly to the working-class communal rite of providing family members with a "proper" funeral. The result was that industrial insurance companies enjoyed a spiral of financial and social success between 1890 and 1940, the same decades in which friendly societies experienced stagnating or declining numbers.
Industrial insurance rose from the fading remains of small mutual burial clubs and "friendly leads," in which friends and family would raise money for burying the recently deceased by walking down the street with hat in hand and corpse in tow. One of the first companies in the field, and quickly the most successful by far, was the Prudential (founded in 1848), which switched from general to industrial insurance in 1854. After buying out its leading rival in 1860, the Prudential commenced a meteoric rise. By 1891 it was writing policies on over 10 million working-class lives, up from 670,000 in 1870; in 1901 its chairman, Henry Harben, announced that Prudential policyholders "represent the nation" since they were "one-third of its population here." Its success bred imitators, including the Refuge and the Pearl, both of which were writing nearly as many policies each year by 1911 as the Prudential. None of these firms departed very far from the Prudential's formula for selling and main- taining their policies, which included a carefully monitored team of salesmen organized into divisions and districts, most of whom doubled as collectors of the weekly premiums; a system of promotion through the ranks whereby hardworking agents could become assistant superintendents, district inspectors, and, in rare cases, directors; and a vast army of clerks who processed the tons of correspondence and agents' accounts that came streaming in from all parts of the country. Shares in all these companies were narrowly held by the founding members, which translated into immense family fortunes. 43 Industrial insurance owed much of its success to the constant presence among the working poor of salesmen and collectors, who persistently touted their companies' merits and made sure policyholders kept up their payments. The companies therefore devoted considerable effort to building a loyal and motivated sales staff. Since their agents were almost exclusively male, an obvious motivating tool was fraternity-the same source of inspiration that had convinced millions of similarly situated men to join friendly societies. Fraternity in the industrial insurance company was a carefully orchestrated part of the staff's work routine, an opportunity for release and reflection that complemented the otherwise lonely job of knocking on doors. Presided over by a district manager (or, on special occasions, a director from London), agents' gatherings included a healthy diet of inspirational speeches, songs, and athletic events, always capped off by a night of smoking and drinking on the company's tab. These were the settings at which the salesman's thoroughly masculine identity was shaped: in turns tactful friend, fierce competitor, and devoted husband. On the latter point (and in contrast to most friendly societies), wives and girlfriends were frequent guests at such gatherings; but their presence-and inevitable absence, at crucial points in the event-only highlighted the importance of fraternity among their male partners. A Britannic super, for instance, "called upon the ladies present" at a Blackpool sales gathering to imitate the district inspector's wife "in supporting, by glad home life, the work of their husbands." As in friendly societies, but less apologetically, fraternalism at these sales meetings relied heavily on the consumption of material goods. Superintendents welcomed successful salesmen into the fold by rewarding their efforts with fountain pens, English lever silver watches, and silvermounted umbrellas (often reporting the cash value of the items to the assembled gathering); dispensed fish carvers and coffee services to agents' wives; and treated their staffs to elaborate, well-documented dinners.44 Such gatherings were as important for their departures from friendly society practice as for their similarities. The features of brotherhood, singing, and speeches, and even the personality cult of the director, all mirrored the social mechanisms at work in the lodge, with its "society ditties" and occasional visits from a Grand Master or Chief Ranger. These overlaps were crucial in contributing to the appeal of the job for insurance salesmen, many of whom were familiar with the similar regalia on offer at lodges. Unlike lodge members, however, whose gatherings doubled as exercises in self-government, insurance salesmen assembled in order to receive instructions from the head office. This was related to a second, equally important difference between the meanings of fraternity in the two institutions. For lodge members, fraternity was an end in itself, although one that many had started to question by 1910. In industrial insurance, fraternity was resolutely a means for achieving the goal of molding a top-notch sales team. To this end, agents were never allowed to forget that they were expected to be active participants in a team sport, in which districts, divisions, and companies ceaselessly jockeyed for the top position in sales figures. Many companies reinforced this lesson by rewarding their top division with a "silver challenge cup" or "Inspector's Challenge Shield," which resided in the local office as long as the division remained in first place. 45 A second form of working-class community that industrial insurance companies consciously encouraged concerned their customers' burial rites. As Paul Johnson has observed, industrial insurance afforded customers with a unique opportunity for exhibiting status in two ways: by offering the neighborhood weekly reminders that a family was doing well enough to pay the collector as he made his rounds and by avoiding the embarrassment of a pauper's funeral.46 The latter service operated by providing cash for a "proper" burial, which consisted in a wooden coffin, a horse and carriage to transport the corpse, funeral attire (also known as "black") for the mourning family, and refreshments for the gathered assembly. Thus provisioned, a working-class funeral had much in common with a friendly society procession, contributing in similar ways to a neighborhood's sense of itself-and also, crucially, allowing mourners to display their "consumer prowess." Unlike the friendly society parade, pany.50 Closest to the large orders in structure and function were the centralized friendly societies, the largest of which was the Hearts of Oak-a Londonbased organization that increased in size from 64,421 members in 1875 to 239,000 in 1899. These provided the same form of insurance (primarily sick pay and old-age pensions) as the Oddfellows and Foresters, with less emphasis on fraternity and local control. Partly because the meaning of "mutual selfhelp" had itself moved so far to the side of "non-profit insurance provision" by 1900, most observers were happy to include the Hearts of Oak and kindred societies under the flag of voluntarism. Their members did, at any rate, send their payments to London, instead of requiring a canvasser to relieve them of their pennies at the doorstep. They were also "self-governing," since their managing committees drew from member-appointed delegates. And on occasion they could even claim the formation of local clubs, even if these were more like electoral colleges (for choosing delegates) than lodges.51
Closer to the industrial offices in most regards were the "collecting" friendly societies, which provided burial insurance and relied on door-to-door canvassers to generate and maintain a steady stream of business. A handful of collecting societies with memberships in the millions took over the field from the thousands of local burial clubs that had blanketed Britain in the 1850s. The two largest, the Royal Liver and the Liverpool Victoria, were founded in Liverpool at midcentury and in fifty years grew to mammoth proportions. Together with the Royal London, these societies enrolled over 6 million members by 1905, or nearly 90 percent of the overall burial society market. In their dayto-day operation, collecting friendly societies provided the same blend of community and consumerism that was supplied by industrial insurance, both for their canvassers (in the form of male bonding at sales meetings) and their customers (by covering the cost of a decent funeral). The only important difference between such societies and the Prudential was that customers, instead of shareholders, were responsible for electing executive officers. Since members had no opportunity to learn about their society's governance except through the collector, this meant that collectors wielded much more power within these societies than did their counterparts in industrial insurance. One result was that boards of directors were dominated by former collectors, who 50 For convenience, and following contemporary usage, the discussion in the remaining two sections will treat centralized friendly societies as belonging to the same class as friendly societies and collecting friendly societies as belonging to the same class as insurance companies. A final category of insurance providers that would qualify as "approved societies" under the NIA were voluntary organizations that offered mutual insurance as distinctly subsidiary lures to attract members to a separate cause. The most important of these combined sickness insurance with appeals to temperance and trade unionism, respectively; but late Victorians also offered sickness or burial insurance in efforts to increase the ranks of the Salvation Army, to encourage church attendance, and to "preserve the Welsh language."53 Temperance friendly societies, the largest of which were the Rechabites and the Sons of Temperance, thrived in the generation after 1870; the Rechabites, for instance, grew from 10,000 members in 1872 to 212,794 in 1910. These societies did well, in part, because they were centralized, owing to their refusal to convene in the public houses that were typically the only available neighborhood meeting places for mutual aid. They were also assiduous in setting up juvenile branches, which they were able to do more successfully than friendly societies since their temperance message appealed more readily to preteens than the more "adult" virtues of conviviality and insurance promoted by the affiliated orders.54
The other major providers of sick pay as an adjunct to a separate purpose were trade unions. The connection between sick pay and trade unionism reached its apogee in the 1860s, when many unions formally registered as friendly societies in order to achieve legal standing (a formality that was rendered unnecessary by Gladstone's Trade Union Act of 1871). Before workers' compensation became law in 1906, sick pay was also a crucial lure for attracting new members, especially in trades with high health and accident risks. Membership in miners' relief funds, for instance, rose from around 20,000 in 1870 to more than 220,000 in 1887, or close to half of all miners working in England. And at least in the higher-paying trades, unions offered larger benefits than those provided by the affiliated orders; the Boilermakers' Society, whose members could afford the high premium of one shilling six pence per week, administered by the Post Office. From another perspective, the state had provided workers with yet another occasion to have their desires molded by the persistent application of a salesman's influence. To some extent, the commissioners who were charged with enforcing the Insurance Act tried to modulate which of these meanings of "choice" would prevail during the membership drive that unfolded in the summer of 1912. More commonly, however, they handed that task over to the approved societies themselves, who engaged in a months-long scrum that would largely set the tone for social welfare over the next three decades.
The National Insurance Commission took seriously its mandate to give workers the widest choice and the greatest freedom in choosing their approved society. It showered British workers over the summer of 1912 with 75 million leaflets, which were scrupulously evenhanded in describing the merits of different types of approved society.58 This mandate of "free choice," however, was narrowly defined and difficult to enforce. Nor did the commissioners address the fact that insurance companies, with their preexisting sales forces numbering in the thousands, were in the best position to preach to the newly captive audience of compulsorily insured workers-leading friendly societies and trade unions to question how "free" a worker's choice really was. The companies' advantage in the membership drive, however, was apparent only in retrospect and it was never uniform. At many workplaces, insurance companies needed to contend with the trade unions' prior presence on the shop floor. Workers who already belonged to a friendly society, similarly, were more likely to ask their club's "approved section" to administer their government insurance than they were to ask an insurance company. But that left a majority of workers who did not belong to either unions or friendly societies prior to 1911 and whose decision to join an approved society was likely to be made at the doorstep. These were the workers whom insurance companies were especially likely to attract, and their numbers were destined to grow with each passing year, as new cohorts entered the workforce for the first time.
The workplace, where the actual transfer of employers' and workers' contributions to the approved societies' funds took place, posed the greatest risk of coercion getting in the way of the workers' free choice of a society. The Insurance Commission hence focused much of their enforcement efforts on preventing employers from dictating the selection process. Charles Masterman announced in 1912 that "pressure, direct or indirect, exerted by employers upon persons in their employment to join particular societies is wholly contrary to the principle of the Act."59 Commissioners were also quick to quell those employers, primarily in rural areas, who tried to boycott the act by refusing 58 either to stamp their workers' insurance cards or to contribute their share. A series of well-publicized fines of recalcitrant employers in 1912 offered convincing evidence that the government was serious about enforcing compliance. Between full freedom of choice and coercion (or obstruction), however, lay a substantial gray area, since it was all but impossible to prevent employers from offering their advice to workers who approached them with questions about the relative merits of approved societies or the general principles of the NIA. And in such cases, the very structure of the NIA tilted the balance in favor of the centralized insurance companies, which could tout their administrative efficiency and marketing savvy to win employers over to their cause. However, trade unions also had clear advantages in the struggle to enroll members at the workplace, since they could build on existing channels of communication to spread the word on the shop floor about a union-sponsored approved society.
Insurance companies were quick to see the advantage in marketing their strengths directly to large employers of labor. They promised that their own long experience with paperwork would ease the employers' administrative burden under the act, and they offered to perform "educational" services at the workplace in order to dispel any confusion the act might have caused among employees. By May 1912 the Prudential had already received invitations from Harrods, Debenhams, and Wallis's to lecture to their workers on how "to secure the greatest advantages under the new law." Once it was time for the employees' contribution cards to be issued, the company again appeared with a helpful scheme to relieve employers of their state-mandated duty to stamp and file the cards between redemption dates. A Prudential circular issued in June 1912 offered to "take over all the cards and ... carry out the many requirements of the Act, the contributions being paid to us direct in one sum." This plan was vetoed by the commission as unfairly restricting the workers' choice of society, despite the Prudential's promise that it would require the employees' written consent and would process cards issued by other approved societies as well as their own.60 Such regulatory vigilance was the exception, however, despite voluntarists' urgings that the state take on a more aggressive role in monitoring workplace canvassing. Even after the Prudential officially backed down from its cardcollecting scheme, complaints continued to filter in from the provinces that insurance companies were getting employers to pressure their workers into signing up with a single provider. complained of the companies' "carnival of misrepresentation" and cited cases in which "employers had stood over their men, or sent their foremen to do it, while the agent of the insurance company took their names." The alleged result, in this case, allowed companies to "coerce trade union members into joining capitalistic and anti-trade union organizations," hence sapping the labor movement of its strength. 61 The Prudential and NAAS tried to fend off such accusations with a volley of interviews and press releases, in which they pointed to the advantages that their superior organization offered to members qua employees. Both firms offered free legal advice to customers who were involved in workers' compensation cases, something only the larger trade unions could match.62 They also presented themselves as lesser evils, in any case, than the many employeroperated approved societies that formed under the act. Most of these were converted versions of shop clubs, which had often required membership as a condition of employment prior to 1911, and some made the transition to national insurance with a great deal of success. The Midland Railway Friendly Society, by paying a penny out of their workers' weekly contribution, convinced 29,000 employees to keep the railway as their insurance provider; and Boots Chemists, which formed a new approved society from scratch, signed up over 6,600 of its 7,000 workers. In this context, the chairman of the Prudential could argue with some justification that his company had been "a real help to the trade unions ... for there is no doubt that without our approved society many 'works' approved societies would have been formed, with the employers in strong force on the managing committees." 63 This appeal had some success in swaying unionized workers from their belief that choosing the Prudential as their national insurance provider would weaken their power on the shop floor, but only within limits. These limits were on display in the mining districts of Northumberland and Durham, where local mine owners had asked the Prudential to set up a special approved society for miners, presumably as a foil against trade union societies. The result testified that even the Prudential could not convince all the people all of the time: only 3,400 miners joined its approved society in those two counties, against 100,000 who joined the approved societies set up by the two largest miners' unions. Insurance companies likewise faced stiff competition for registering state-in-sured members in Burnley, where the local weavers' union enrolled 28 percent of the borough's eligible members; and in Northampton, where the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives outpaced companies and friendly societies alike.64 Such cases were the exceptions, however, and they appeared only in regions with heavy concentrations of thoroughly unionized skilled workers who were likely to hold prior loyalties to a union. Unions were relatively unsuccessful at using the NIA to attract new members, as some labor leaders had hoped would happen. Overall union membership only increased by 8 percent during the membership drive of 1912, which was less than the increases in 1911 or 1913. Furthermore, the fact that unions had more pressing concerns than administering sick pay often handicapped their efforts on behalf of the NIA, especially given the volatile state of labor relations during the three years before World War I. The secretary of the Durham Miners' Association suggested that its approved society would have signed up far more than 24,000 of its 140,000 members had it not been for a miners' strike in March 1912, followed by the debate on the Minimum Wage Act, which took up most of the union's energy. 65 Workplace battles between companies and unions were also waged in the realm of women's employment. Where women were already unionized, they tended to remain in their union's approved society in greater proportion than was the case for unions more generally, which had an overall retention rate of 50 percent. No such scruples got in the way of insurance company agents, whose success at enrolling new subscribers after 1912 built on their ability in the initial drive to attract the vast majority of British workers with no prior allegiance to a voluntary society. These agents quickly discovered that the state, by compelling people to insure, had done half their canvassing work for them. "Millions of people are being shepherded by a benevolent Government into Approved Societies," noted the Liverpool Victoria Record in July 1912, providing a "unique" opportunity that was "already passing away." As a Wrexham salesman put it in a prize essay on how to make the NIA pay, the act got him "into the houses," where he could "find out all I can about the man's family connections, his income, and what insurance he already holds, and then proceed to canvass him for all I am worth wherever I see an opening." Life offices also hoped that guaranteed sickness insurance would cut back on lapsing, since it would prevent surplus income from being lost to healthcare costs. Along these lines, the Insurance Mail suggested in November 1911 that "peaceful persuasion" could be applied to induce members to hand over part of their benefit to make up back premiums.74 These incentives were usually enough to get salesmen to double as representatives of the NIA-despite the fact that they only 
THE PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION
The insurance companies' vision of approved society membership, in which members were waited upon at their doorsteps by agents who would "fetch and carry everything related to State insurance business," was not exactly what Lloyd George claimed was on offer when he first presented the NIA in 1911. In its original form, national insurance was supposed to universalize the principles of local and participatory self-help and self-abnegation that had originally been the exclusive preserve of benefit clubs and trade unions. The Liberals reinforced this idea by nominally requiring every approved society to be "subject to the absolute control of its members" and by forcing the companies, which were anything but democratic in form, to create "a separate self-governing department which would be precluded from working for a profit." The problem, however, lay in defining what "self-governing" could possibly mean for a company like the Prudential, with closely held stocks and millions of customers who lived far from its head office in London. William Braithwaite, who was put in charge of squaring this circle, developed "an elaborate system of local life for Friendly Societies" in March 1911, which he tried to extend to the companies by requiring their approved societies' members to operate on a delegate system.78 Following Braithwaite's firsthand account, Bentley Gilbert has provided a detailed reconstruction of the process by which this participatory vision was almost wholly derailed. By casting aspersions on the affiliated orders' financial affairs, and by forging temporary alliances with doctors and centralized friendly societies, the companies masterfully gutted Lloyd George's bill of its original participatory intentions. Braithwaite blamed party politics for this turn of events: the Conservatives, despite being "pledged up to the hilt to support the Friendly Societies," were prone to sell out to the "vested interest of the Companies," and the collectors and agents were "a powerful force on the Liberal side at elections." But there was also a deep internal divide among the NIA's architects regarding the relative priority to be attached to self-governed approved societies or comprehensive coverage of workers. Braithwaite claimed that he "would rather see the scheme mismanaged, than managed for profit," while Masterman assumed the top priority was to "get the nation insured." And in the end, even Braithwaite was willing to embrace "a healthy competition between societies" (including those with for-profit branches) in order to hedge against half the population coming in as Post Office contributors. As a result, "self-government" in approved societies soon came to mean whatever the society in question desired. For insurance companies, this meant the farthest thing imaginable from democracy. The Prudential Approved Societies-which the New Statesman ridiculed as a "weird travesty of a Friendly Society"-required a quorum of twelve members at its Holborn Bars office, which invariably translated into "clerks with time on their hands"; an NAAS general meeting, with its slightly higher quorum of fifty members, attracted an average attendance of 250.79
The decision to allow industrial insurance companies to take part in the NIA on their own terms was portentous, since it marked the beginning of the end of the friendly society as a viable alternative to the provision of welfare by big business or big government. Far from marking a simple victory of consumerism over community, however, the effects of the NIA on voluntarism can be interpreted more fruitfully as preserving certain kinds of community at the expense of others. Since the 1850s friendly societies had been trying to yoke working-class spending habits to their masculine rituals of respectability in order to preserve a unique space for political expression and administrative self-control. These efforts were starting to wear thin by 1911, partly owing to the spread of less demanding types of consumption among working-class men, but also due to the increasing tendency of middle-class reformers and workingclass wives to view friendly societies as "abstract" (actuarial) rather than "qualitative" (fraternal) communities. These internal shifts within the friendly society movement help account for the ease with which the industrial insurance companies translated their phenomenal commercial success into the political coup of taking over nearly half the business generated by the NIA. By privileging "abstract" over "qualitative" meanings of community in the name of comprehensive coverage, the NIA strengthened the companies' hand while intensifying the dilemmas that had saddled friendly societies since the 1880s. Its prejudicial impact on voluntarism, furthermore, was felt more severely by friendly societies than by other voluntary organizations registered under the NIA-most notably trade unions-which offered members other benefits besides fraternity and sick pay.
Most friendly societies had suspected for years that younger working men were less likely to be interested in the trappings of fraternity than their forebears had been, yet they continued to rely on fraternity to fuel their older members' participation in lodge affairs. The NIA intervened in this dilemma by giving new artillery to the many club men who urged their societies to change with the times. In 1912 the executive council of the Shepherds recommended the optional omission of "passwords in cypher" at lodge meetings, and similar resolutions were adopted by the Foresters and Nottingham Odd- clubs to choose among the equally impolitic options of abandoning the pub as a meeting place, withholding state benefits from wives and daughters of members, or not allowing female members to attend meetings. The Oddfellows puzzled over these choices at length at their 1913 meeting before determining that separate female lodges should be established wherever possible, and that where there were not enough women for that they could be grouped into larger district lodges-a solution which was less than ideal both from an actuarial standpoint and in terms of their localist ideals.84
A final instance in which the NIA detracted from the fraternal side of friendly societies concerned sick visitation and the related problem of malingering. One of the strongest features of the friendly society system had long been the "sympathetic visitor," who brought "into the house of the afflicted brother ... not only the benefit which the sick member has contributed for, but also a word of cheer and comfort from his brothers in the Order."85 The NIA tested the limits of this system by substituting the state for the friendly society as the source of sick pay, hence reducing the incentive for members to be honest about exactly how ill they felt; and the larger number of members after 1911 made it harder for visitors to be as vigilant or as friendly as before. Walter Wright complained that the visitor now "rushes round on Friday night or Saturday, hands the money in, . . . takes a receipt for the benefit, and goes."86 The NIA also limited the extent to which lodges could count on the assistance of doctors to report cases of malingering. Although club men had not always seen eye to eye with doctors before 1911, most assumed they could trust their local physician to protect their finances by informing the lodge when a member was faking illness. These doctors were typically hired by the societies and felt more loyal to the club as a whole than to any individual member.87 The NIA replaced this system with a scheme of "panel doctors" who attended all stateinsured people in their district, hence dividing the doctors' loyalties between members' claims to collect sick pay and societies' concerns about solvency. to doctors who were less inclined to send them back to work; and club officials often lacked the resources to "get behind the doctors' certificates," as the Foresters' Chief Ranger lamented.88 Friendly society leaders were convinced that newly recruited members, who had no previous exposure to voluntary thrift, were more likely to try to get an extra week off at the club's expense. One auditor complained that these new members often viewed their approved society "as many unscrupulous people do railway companies, 'fair game to be done' as often as possible." Wright saw malingering as an example of womenThe NIA allowed these "national" insurance companies to pass themselves off as more national than ever after 1911. By requiring millions of working women and previously uninsured men to choose an approved society, the act played into the companies' existing strengths. In the process, members of the companies' approved societies took on a status that was somewhere between citizen and customer, and the salesmen who doubled as representatives of the NIA occupied a gray area between civil service and customer service. By blurring the boundary between their massive market share and the social needs of Britain's masses, these societies perversely came far closer than the friendly societies to achieving T. H. Marshall's ideal of citizenship as "full membership of a community." So defined, however, citizenship implied almost no active political participation, apart from the minority of managers and middlemen who made sure the system ran smoothly. The only problems of participation faced by the insurance companies, consequently, concerned their continuing ability to motivate their staff, and their ability to foil their customers' attempted evasions of the NIA. They solved the first problem by shifting their employees' identity from loyal company man to loyal civil servant, and they solved the second by hiring new employees who specialized in policing the claims. Whole categories of problems that plagued the friendly societies-the unpopularity of passwords, women's voting rights, and the proscription on pubs-never emerged for insurance companies; and other problems, like the extra red tape required by the NIA, were easily absorbed by the companies' existing bureaucracy. 91 It did not require a great leap for companies to adapt their standard motivational methods to the new circumstances of the NIA. After spending many years telling their agents that they were doing more for Britain's working poor than the government or organized charity could hope to accomplish, it was relatively easy to convince salesmen that paying out state-subsidized sick pay was the next logical step in their evolution as quasi-public servants. Thomas Neill, an executive at the Pearl Life Assurance Company who spent three years as an Insurance Commissioner before returning to the private sector as head of the NAAS in 1915, referred in his inaugural chairman's speech to "the great Light or the Secret and Success of Industrial Life Assurance (Glasgow, 1892), pp.
28-29.
91 In one sense the NIA did contribute to more far-reaching administrative changes in industrial insurance, by leading Joseph Burn at the Prudential to start experimenting with the "block system" of canvassing and collecting. This system, which replaced large districts patrolled by competing agents with much smaller "blocks" that were exclusive to single agents, was introduced by Burn in 1912 in direct response to the NIA. Following its rapid acceleration during the labor shortage effected by World War I, this system would greatly reduce overhead expenses at the Prudential and would eventually be extended to other industrial companies by government mandate. See Dennett (n. 43 above), pp. 192-94, 228-30. social work in which the National Amalgamated is engaged." This "social work," once defined as teaching "thrift" to the working poor, was reinterpreted as helping approved society members "realise their position and duties under the Act." By teaching their customers to be good citizens, claimed the Prudential's A. C. Thompson, the "true missionaries of thrift" who sold insurance would finally receive the recognition they deserved as model citizens in their own right. A London and Manchester director urged his company's Camberwell agents that they "must work this Bill" so that it would "go down to posterity that our men were worthy citizens of a great country."92 Considered in the abstract, it was indeed worthy to teach workers their responsibilities under the new regime of compulsory insurance. But such an education, as the companies defined it, was a far cry from the New Liberal ideal of molding ignorant workers into fully informed and active voters. Members of the NAAS or the Prudential approved societies received information only when they were confused about what to do, not as a resource that they could exploit to think independently about social problems. If "perplexity regarding the Act" ever arose, promised Thompson, a sales representative would be "at hand to explain any difficulty which may present itself." In direct proportion to the salesman's ability to supply information "generously and tirelessly" to the several dozen approved society members in his book, those members were relieved of the need to become active citizens. The National Insurance Gazette, which for the most part supported the companies' involvement in the NIA, could not resist archly observing that their marketing tactics would "encourage the employee to shelve his responsibilities under the Act." This would be unfortunate, since the NIA had provided such a great opportunity for the worker "to look into things, to follow them ... to learn to do his civic duty-to look after the sanitary conditions of his town, etc." Instead, the companies were urging workers "to push all the work... on to the shoulders of an obliging approved society and its local and chief officers."93
Treating citizens as customers also meant that insurance companies were far less chary than friendly societies about policing the behavior of their approved society members. They went into the NIA assuming that members would try to work the act to their material advantage by faking illness and seeking out lenient doctors, and further assuming that it was more cost-effective to police this behavior than to try to teach members that "shopping" and mutual insurance did not mix. These assumptions led them to hire full-time sick visitors and claims managers who played "bad cop" to the salesman's generosity and good cheer. sales managers in the case of men or licensed nurses in the case of women, were not of the same class as their members-in clear distinction with friendly society visitors. Lucy Handel Booth, the head sick visitor for the Prudential Approved Societies, claimed that society members were less likely to try to deceive "educated, observant, and tactful women" whose prior experience as social workers or nurses commanded deference. When handling claims, the companies' approved societies were no less determined to guard their solvency against the "shopping" proclivities of their members. The NAAS claims department kept its 230 clerks well supplied with medical dictionaries and a set of strict guidelines to help them tell which illnesses merited how much time off work. In such cases, reported the society's actuary J. A. Jefferson, it was standard practice to write "to the panel doctor direct" with the request that he "pay a little attention to the question whether the patient in his opinion is really now incapable of work."94 Trade unions faced more challenges than insurance companies in squaring the demands of the NIA with their prior administrative patterns, but in doing so they faced less dire consequences than in the friendly societies' case. Gender was less of an issue for unions because they were organized around trades, which continued to be gender-specific, and not around consumption, which was gender-blind. The all-male Boilermakers' Society, for instance, succeeded in enrolling nearly three-fourths of its members in its approved society, despite the fact that many of these 48,000 men presumably had working wives who belonged to a different society. Furthermore, patterns of leadership in most unions were so securely masculine that no influx of female members would have likely caused any disruption. The Card Blowers' Union, where female members comprised a large majority but routinely elected an all-male management committee, delegated no women to manage its approved society despite the even larger majority of over 80 percent women who had enrolled. The case for women's suffrage translating into women officials was not much stronger in the Amalgamated Weavers, where only six of thirty-six districtapproved societies elected women to serve on the managing committee (and two of these districts could not help but do so, since they included no men at all).95
The NIA did lead to some dissension between executive officers and members over administrative issues at meetings held in 1912 by the railway servants' and engineers' unions, but these were easily patched up. It similarly played an important but still subsidiary role in the hotly contested reorganization of the dock trade that began in 1912. Even these relatively minor difficulties were absent in most unions, which were already centralized or moving in that direction prior to 1911. And since many smaller unions had already combined to form the General Federated Trade Union (GFTU) before 1911-which was quick to form an approved society under the NIA-they had a convenient method close at hand for relieving their secretaries of the act's administrative burdens.96 The unions' response to malingering under the NIA similarly shared some, but not all, of the concerns that dogged friendly societies. Union officials agreed with the friendly societies that new members (especially women) were prone to "abuse" the act by flocking to lenient doctors. W. A. Appleton of the GFTU argued that women had "been compelled for a great many centuries to get the best of every bargain they could, and they tried to get the best they could in insurance"; he concluded that it might be several generations before women workers would regard mutual insurance "as some of us have regarded it." However, the unions' primary location in the workplace made it easier for them to detect malingering without disrupting their existing administrative structures. As Appleton observed: "We have means, perhaps outside the ordinary society, of knowing when a man is at work and is not. His mates in the shop know, and soon let you know."97
In all these cases, the underlying constant was that the NIA had relatively little to do with the more general success or failure of the trade union movement. The two world wars recruited far more workers into unions than the state-assisted offer of an extra ten shillings per week in sick pay; and the shift from industrial to service-sector jobs, not the replacement of the NIA with the NHS, was what led most of the older unions to suffer major losses after World War 11.98 The situation was different with friendly societies, for which getting the NIA to succeed on their own terms was crucial to their very existence. Even in their case, however, the administrative challenges posed by compulsory insurance merely accelerated a process that had been going on for decades-one that was rooted in the gradual prevalence of "sickness insurance" over "fraternity" translation of the "old and respected title Friendly Societies" into "approved societies" meant that "our future success depends upon how far we are approved by the Public." Or, in the more blunt conclusion of a Mersey Oddfellow who witnessed the "increasing competition of compulsory State Insurance": "we must advertise or die."10' British friendly societies have faded away over the last century, but they have not died. The little that remains today of the thriving late-Victorian culture of fraternal self-help has lately undergone a revival, as various factions within New Labour have worked to turn Tony Blair's "Third Way" from a political slogan into concrete social policy. In one formulation, these factions divide into "managerialist modemisers" like Peter Mandelson, who "believe in the merits of private-sector management and contracting out"; and "mutual modemisers" like Frank Field, who aim to help a lagging voluntary sector retool for a vibrant life in the new century. The first of these middle roads between Thatcherism and welfarism betrays little if any sense of British history, choosing instead to tread in the recently formed footprints of countries that are well on the way to placing social services on the for-profit auction block. By failing to notice the powerful historical precedent for their vision of the future, managerialists have missed an opportunity; but they also have failed to see how the welfare state itself rests, to a great extent, on a foundation built by profitconscious managers. The mutual middle road, in contrast, first passes through "the pre-socialist history of the left" in an effort to revive a "'libertarian socialist' tradition" capable of replastering a human face onto the welfare state. By romanticizing the past accomplishments of voluntarism, mutualists risk ignoring the weaknesses that put voluntary societies at such a disadvantage in 1911. One advocate of a mutualist "Third Way," for instance, offers it as a "challenge to male-dominated centralised control" without reflecting that the institutions that comprise his historical model lost out to managerialism in part because they excluded women.'02 In the present-day search for a "third way," a closer look at the quasi-public administration of the NIA would appear to be warranted. Without it, the last century's contest between voluntary societies and private companies to provide a safety net for the British citizen-consumer-painted in such vividly tragic colors by latter-day mutualists-is likely to be restaged in the new century as a farce.
